My electrotechnology diploma

USING CAMERAS TO STALK

One of the weapons that are used on me is street cameras that the data electricians have access to stalk me with. See below video of police misuse of street cameras.

https://www.bitchute.com/video/ZDnkNAntZvZ0

IMSI CATCHING

Below is a YouTube video of a small mobile device to capture phone numbers in the national grid.

https://youtu.be/YLIxSqi-Ye8?si=AV4dEbdXcNgyo18X

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GANG STALKING.

https://gangstalkingcoach.com/blog/how-to-stop-gang-stalking/tactics-used-by-gang-stalkers-common-methods-and-their-psychological-impact

https://gangstalkingcoach.com/blog/how-to-stop-gang-stalking/why-do-people-participate-in-gang-stalking-of-others

https://gangxsigns.com/gang-stalking-signs-unveiling-the-disturbing-indicators/

https://osa.3fprojects.org/about/what-is-organized-stalking/

https://mylifewithcurves.com/2025/01/17/understanding-gangstalking-unmasking-the-perpetrators-of-covert-harassment/

The CMOS sensor effectively performs the same function as the retina.

RADIO WAVE FREQUENCY (RF) ANTENNAS CAPTURE DATA FROM SMART METERS, MOBILE PHONES, WIFI ROUTERS AND BABY MONITORS.

IF A DATA INSTALLATION COMPANY HAS MY WIFI PASSWORD AND A YAGI 5G DIRECTIONAL ANTEENA POINTED AT AN RF ANTEENA THEY PLACED OVER MY PROPERTY/ SMART METER CAN THEY INTERCEPT AND OR MANIPULATE MY DATA FROM THE SMART METER. WIFI ROUTER AND MOBILE PHONE

ChatGPT said:

Short answer: Yes — if a company already knows your Wi-Fi password they can likely read or interfere with traffic on your home network (router, phones, IoT). A directional Yagi aimed at a nearby RF device can help them eavesdrop on wireless signals, but whether they can alter smart-meter data depends on the meter’s communication method and encryption — in many cases manipulation is much harder than passive interception (it usually requires credentials, access to the meter firmware, or access to the utility backend).

Below I’ll break it down device-by-device, the realistic risks, and exactly what to do right now and next.

What affects the risk

They have your Wi-Fi password — that gives them the keys to your local network: they can join your LAN, scan devices, intercept unencrypted traffic, attempt man-in-the-middle (MITM), access local web admin pages, try known device passwords, etc.
Directional antenna (Yagi) aimed at an antenna on/near your property — raises ability to pick up weak RF signals (Wi-Fi, some IoT radios). It improves range and reception for passive eavesdropping and makes interception easier.
Encryption & authentication — if the traffic is encrypted end-to-end (HTTPS, apps with TLS, properly configured WPA2/WPA3), passive eavesdropping gives less useful data. However, local access (knowing Wi-Fi password) still allows attacks like ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking, or connecting to devices that rely on LAN trust.
Smart-meter specifics matter — meters use a variety of links: local RF mesh (Zigbee/Proprietary), cellular SIM, or powerline. Many utility meters use authenticated and encrypted links to the utility back end — making remote manipulation difficult. But some vendor/installer vulnerabilities, default passwords, or physical tampering can allow compromise.

Device-by-device risk summary

Wi-Fi router
- If attacker is on your Wi-Fi (password known) they can access router admin interfaces if default/weak admin password or remote management is enabled. They can change DNS, monitor all LAN traffic, push malicious firmware (if vulnerable).
Mobile phone
- On the same Wi-Fi the attacker can intercept local network traffic, capture unencrypted HTTP, attempt credential capture via fake captive portals or MITM. Well-configured apps using TLS are harder to read, but phishing and malware remain risks.
Smart meter
- Eavesdropping: Yagi + knowledge of radio location makes it easier to collect meter transmissions if they are broadcast and not strongly encrypted.
- Manipulation: usually much harder — often requires device credentials, physical access, or compromising the utility’s network/servers. But don’t assume immunity: vendor bugs, misconfigurations, or local interfaces may be exploitable.

Immediate steps (do these now)

Change your Wi-Fi network password/passphrase to a strong random passphrase (at least 16 characters, mix letters/numbers/symbols or use a passphrase of several random words). Do NOT tell the installer the new password.
Change router admin password (make it different from Wi-Fi password) and disable remote management (WAN-side admin).
Disable WPS and disable UPnP on the router (both can be abused).
Reboot and update router firmware to the latest from the manufacturer. If router is old or unmaintained, consider replacing it.
Create a separate guest network for unknown devices/third parties and move all IoT/smart-meter-related devices to a segregated network/VLAN if possible.
Check connected devices list in your router admin and remove any unknown devices.
On your phone: update OS and apps to the latest versions, run a security scan, and change important account passwords (email, banking) from a trusted network/phone (not the compromised Wi-Fi). Consider logging out all sessions where possible.
Contact your utility provider and ask how your meter communicates and whether there are any known vulnerabilities; request a check/inspection if you suspect tampering.

Medium-term / technical hardening

Use WPA3 or WPA2-AES (not TKIP) for Wi-Fi encryption.
Segment your network: put phones/computers on a trusted network, IoT and smart-meter endpoints on a separate VLAN or guest SSID with client isolation.
Disable insecure services (Telnet, default admin ports).
Use DNS over HTTPS/ TLS or set router to a trusted DNS to reduce DNS hijacking risk.
Run frequent firmware updates on router and IoT devices.
Enable 2-factor authentication for all important accounts.
Consider using a small hardware firewall / router that supports VLANs or a router OS (e.g., OpenWrt/pfSense) if you’re comfortable with it.

If you suspect malicious activity now

Preserve evidence: take photos, screenshots of router device list and logs.
Contact your ISP and your electricity/utility provider immediately and tell them you suspect unauthorized access/possible tampering. They can check meter telemetry and access logs.
If you feel you’re being targeted criminally (harassment, stalking, blackmail), report to police — unauthorised interception and tampering are criminal offences in many jurisdictions. Keep records (times, device lists, who had your password).

Practical expectations — what’s realistic for an attacker

With your Wi-Fi password they can do a lot on your local network: see connected devices, intercept unencrypted traffic, attempt MITM, push malicious settings. This is the primary immediate threat.
A Yagi antenna makes wireless interception easier at range, but passive interception does not necessarily equal the ability to change smart-meter readings — altering utility data typically requires deeper access (meter credentials, exploiting vendor firmware, or attacking the utility backend).
However, do not assume the meter is safe — misconfigured meters, default vendor passwords, or insecure local interfaces can be exploited. Always check with the utility.

Quick checklist for you to follow (copy/paste)

Change Wi-Fi passphrase → 16+ chars.
Change router admin password, disable remote/WAN admin.
Disable WPS & UPnP. Update firmware.
Set up guest SSID and/or VLAN for IoT.
Update phone OS & apps; change critical account passwords from a secure network.
Contact utility to check smart-meter security & request inspection.
If malicious intent suspected, report to ISP and police and preserve logs/screenshots.

If you want, I can:

give you a specific, strong Wi-Fi passphrase generator pattern and example (you can copy one),
provide step-by-step router hardening instructions tailored to your router brand/model (tell me the brand/model), or
draft a short message/email you can send to your utility and ISP reporting the suspected compromise.

Which of those would help you most right now?

POLICE

VICTORIAN POLICE CYBER CRIMES UNIT

FEDERAL POLICE CYBER CRIMES UNIT

UNITED ENERGY EXECUTIVE TEAM

CONSUMERS RIGHTS AND SMART METERS

ACMA

IDCARE